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ELECTORAL MALAPPORTIONMENT
Partisanship, Rhetoric and Reform in the Shadow of the Agrarian 
Strong-man
Graeme Orr and Ron Levy*
This article revisits the zonal malapportionment and Johrymander
endemic in Queenslands electoral system before the Fitzgerald
Inquiry and examines how reform was won. Fitzgerald spent little time 
justifying his intuition that an unfair electoral system eroded 
accountability, and devolved to the Electoral and Administrative 
Review Commission (EARC) the task of rewriting Queensland
electoral law. It did so by adopting precepts well established in other 
Australian jurisdictions; the process was one of liberalising, but not 
groundbreaking, catch-up. The Queensland example is intriguing for 
the paradoxes it presented. Bjelke-Petersens electoral manipulations 
merged pretence with openness. The concept of zonal weighting was 
given historical and policy justifications and cloaked behind the work 
of putatively independent commissions, yet its inherent partisanship 
was a notorious fact. More curious still, the manipulations were 
unnecessary either as a means of maintaining the conservatives in 
office or as a legal subterfuge evading constitutional constraints. 
Rather, Bjelke-Petersens pointed rejection of democratic pluralism 
married with the projection of an image of leadership by right. Viewing 
Queenslands zonal system in the larger perspective of manipulation 
of electoral maps, this article compares populist strongmen in South 
Australia (Playford) and Québec (Duplessis), who employed similar 
rhetoric to entrench themselves in power. Ultimately, as others had, 
Queenslands government constructed a long-running but brittle form 
of agrarian chauvinism, in which the signalling of anti-democratic 
values inherent in the zonal system was an important rhetorical 
component. Bjelke-Petersen was proud to govern over, rather than 
through, democracy.
Once upon a time an academic said to me: ‘In thirty years people will wonder 
what happened in Queensland in the seventies. It will all sound like a fairy
tale — a man ruling with 19 per cent of the vote, a state politician whose 
manoeuvres removed a federal government.’1
— Hugh Lunn (1978)
* Graeme Orr is an Associate Professor in the School of Law, University of Queensland. 
Ron Levy is a Lecturer in the Griffith Law School. The authors are much indebted to 
Colin Hughes, Paul Reynolds, Dominique Marshall, Louis Massicotte and the editors of 
this symposium for their close readings and comments on the paper; any errors remain 
those of the authors.
1 Lunn (1978), p ix. Note one infelicity: Bjelke-Petersen never ruled with 19 per cent of 
the vote — though his predecessor did. In Bjelke-Petersen’s time the Country/National 
Party won between 20 and 40 per cent, and his Liberal Party Coalition partners hovered 
between 20 and 30 per cent.
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Introduction: From Fitzgerald to Fairness 
Any account of the inquiry of Tony Fitzgerald QC and its effects on Queensland 
confronts a conundrum. Fitzgerald’s was a Commission of Inquiry into police 
corruption; indeed, it began as a limited investigation into brushfires in the policing 
of vice in Brisbane. How did this fire spread to consume not just a 32-year-old 
Country (later National) Party administration, but to generate from its ashes a 
rewriting of public law in the state? This article describes that process in relation to 
Queensland electoral law, and in particular the malapportionment of the electoral 
map. In doing so, it places developments in Queensland in the larger perspective of 
historical and international manipulation of electoral maps.
The central feature of Queensland electoral law prior to Fitzgerald was its 
zonal system for distributing electorates in the unicameral parliament. Inaugurated 
by a Labor administration in the 1940s, the system was fine-tuned under 
conservative Premiers Frank Nicklin and (most egregiously) Joh Bjelke-Petersen. In 
symbolic terms, as well as in its conception of representation, the system married 
with Bjelke-Petersen’s identification of himself and his party with Queensland’s 
decentralised regions. 
One of the major legacies of the Fitzgerald process was to wash away this 
system of malapportionment. It did so by adopting the model that was then standard 
in the rest of Australia, namely one-vote, one-value within a 10 per cent tolerance, 
overseen by a genuinely independent redistribution commission (albeit that in a 
quirky nod to the problems of representing the most sparsely populated parts of 
Queensland, some allowance was given for seats over 100 000 km²).
Two further electoral reforms of secondary significance were:
(a) the reintroduction of optional preferential voting;
(b) a mild form of campaign finance regulation.
None of these reforms was ground-breaking, let alone radical. Indeed, the public 
law reforms that resulted from the Fitzgerald process (including freedom of 
information law) were a form of catch-up as much as a great modernisation. Liberal 
legal values that had found little traction in the previous several decades flowed into 
the normative vacuum created by the collapse of a corrupt administration. They 
were ushered in by a QC’s musings in the Fitzgerald Report and an expert law 
reform commission in the form of Fitzgerald’s EARC offspring.
Whilst the focus of this paper is on the undoing of the malapportionment, we 
are not so much concerned with the mechanics of the system pre- or post-reform. 
The more interesting story involves understanding what role the manipulation of 
electoral maps actually played in Queensland under Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Before we 
turn to consider how reform was won, we will explore that deeper story, including 
by considering two comparable examples of attempts by strong-man populists to 
entrench themselves in power. This story requires the distinguishing of different 
motivations in the design of partisan electoral laws, in particular electoral necessity 
and legal evasion. Neither of these was strictly present in Queensland. 
Instead, we find in Queensland a paradoxical merging of pretence and 
openness. Parliament did not directly draw the boundaries of electoral districts 
(Mount Isa aside), allowing the appearance of a figleaf of independence. Further, 
the concept of zonal weighting was given historical and policy justifications, even 
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though its inherent partisanship was a notorious fact. Ultimately, Queensland 
exhibited a long-running, but brittle form of agrarian chauvinism, in which the 
signalling of anti-democratic values inherent in the zonal system was an important 
rhetorical component. Bjelke-Petersen was proud to govern over, rather than 
through, democracy.
Malapportionment Queensland Style
Electoral Manipulation as Rhetoric
Electoral district maps are literally the ground rules of elections. The maps offer at 
least two kinds of temptations to governments, who can draw district lines 
(gerrymander) and tweak voter numbers in the districts (malapportion) to yield 
election outcomes ‘contrary to the preferences of their constituents’.2 Bjelke-
Petersen’s government succumbed occasionally to the former, but most especially 
to the latter. But there was a paradox at the heart of its strategy. The manipulation 
of electoral ground rules was elaborate, yet in a strict sense unnecessary. Bjelke-
Petersen won every election he contested as Premier by comfortable margins. The 
Coalition governments he led would have secured power even without tweaking 
electoral maps in their favour. 
The zonal system is usually depicted as having been calibrated to advance two 
goals. One was to magnify the government’s support in both remote regions and in 
agriculturally oriented coastal and hinterland communities. This was done by over-
weighting their votes and, in relation to the coastal and hinterland communities, 
separating them from Labor-leaning provincial cities.3 The second goal was to 
reinforce the status of the Country/National Party as the dominant conservative 
force over its urbanised Coalition partner, the Liberal Party.4
However, as Mackerras argues, the system did not guarantee Country/National 
dominance.5 The party’s real secret lay in having its support concentrated in 
winnable seats. Electoral map manipulation only accentuated the deeper distortion 
inherent in the winner-takes-all system. This system, which inflates the ratio of 
votes earned to seats won by the largest party, particularly when its rivals are weak 
or divided, is endemic in former British colonies.6 Of course, as the epigraph of this 
article suggests, it was remarkable that the Country/National Party dominated the 
Coalition government with just on 20 per cent of the raw vote from the implosion of 
Queensland Labor at the 1957 election until the Labor rout of 1974.7 Even at its 
2 Klarman (1997), p 498.
3 Reynolds (2009), text at table 5.1.
4 Reynolds (1990), p 245.
5 Mackerras (1990a), p 250. See also Mackerras (1990b).
6 For instance, the Nationals won government outright in 1986 with just under 40 per cent 
of the vote, but in doing so won a majority in seats that contained a majority of the 
population: Mackerras (1990a), p 252. 
7 Their total vote barely moved in a range between 19.28 per cent (1966) and 20.02 per 
cent (1969). But this vote must be understood in context: the Country Party stood in 
under 45 per cent of seats, while its Liberal Party partner tended to stand in the 
remainder.
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apogee of support, Bjelke-Petersen’s party achieved just 39.64 per cent in 1986, 
when it was elected to majority government in its own right, free of a Coalition with 
the Liberals, for the only time.8
Why, then, did the conservative Coalition (because the Liberals, at least while 
in Cabinet, supported the laws) commit itself to undermining the integrity of 
electoral law if it were not a mathematical necessity? By conventional reasoning, 
obviously partisan manoeuvres in electoral mapmaking should have cost Bjelke-
Petersen’s government dearly in political capital. Still more puzzling, why did it 
proceed indirectly by maintaining an elaborate, if almost wholly unconvincing, 
façade of propriety? Queensland at the time had few of the robust legal safeguards 
for political equality that in other jurisdictions mean partisans must act with stealth.
The era of Bjelke-Petersen offers a compelling subject for election law scholars 
because the usual explanations for partisan electoral maps fall short. 
The answers centre not principally on direct legal and electoral consequences, 
but rather on the political rhetoric implicit in partisan election law. Under normal 
political rules, when governments write egregiously biased electoral laws, they emit 
a whiff of desperation — clinging to office against the currents of public sentiment. 
Some incumbents find themselves duly ejected from office by voters, despite the 
apparent security of legal entrenchment. But, although famously inarticulate, 
Bjelke-Petersen was a skilled rhetorical practitioner. His pointed rejection of 
democratic pluralism was of a piece with a larger set of efforts to project an image 
of leadership by right over the state.9 Bjelke-Petersen’s cultivated image of 
reactionary, xenophobic, strong-man leadership took off in 1971, when his 
government quelled anti-apartheid protests with a brutal police response, and 
continued thereafter.10 Partisan electoral laws served an important related purpose 
— victory through regular democratic channels being too prosaic for a political 
movement marked by an energetic appeal to agrarian and state chauvinism.11 The 
message needed to be one of control over, rather than through, Queensland 
democracy. 
Understanding the rhetoric implicit in partisan tricks of electoral regulation is a 
condition precedent for understanding why some such tricks succeed, others fail 
and still others succeed for a time before failing catastrophically and handing 
lasting power to the former opposition. This section therefore also considers why 
some gerrymanders and malapportionments consume political capital while others 
appear to create it; looking first to Queensland and then elsewhere (to South 
Australia and to Québec) brings this question into relief. 
8 Bjelke-Petersen had formed a Liberal-less government in 1983, but only after the 
Liberals had withdrawn from the Coalition agreement and then only by luring two 
Liberal ministers into the National Party.
9 On Bjelke-Petersen’s projection of Queensland ‘nationalism’, see Head (1986). 
10 Lunn (1978), pp 85–89. The image was partly a deliberate creation of media advisers, 
and partly the product of advisers simply letting Bjelke-Petersen be Bjelke-Petersen by 
encouraging him to ‘capitalise on his beliefs and prejudices, which were after all bound 
to be shared by many in Queensland’: Head (1986).
11 On rural chauvinism in Queensland, see Wear (1990), pp 262–63.
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A Gratuitous Scheme
Electoral map-making is properly a task reserved for commissions at arm’s length 
from government. But as Premier, Bjelke-Petersen inherited, embraced and 
expanded a system of zonal weighting. The partisan map-making methods used are 
well described in other works and are only rehearsed here in brief outline, in order 
to focus instead on the rhetoric according to which the government manufactured 
and sold barefaced electoral manipulations to a mostly tolerant public.
In 1971, 1977 and 1986, the Bjelke-Petersen government kept notionally 
independent commissions on a short lead.12 Legislation carved Queensland into 
zones, each having a unique quota of voters for its average district. Combining odd 
zonal borders with unequal distributions of voters inflated Country/National Party 
outcomes, offering a substantial electoral buffer for both conservative power and 
the party’s dominance. This wasn’t a gerrymander in the pure sense of artificially 
drawn boundaries of individual constituencies — although there were a few notable 
examples of that.13 Rather, the partisan manipulation was achieved via a scheme of 
weighting reflecting the demographic appeal of the Country/National Party. 
The zonal system was notable for the disparity between city districts in the 
South-East Zone and the vast, outlying Western and Far-Northern Zone. A typical 
ratio provided for one voter in a western district for every two voters in a district in 
the Labor- and Liberal-contested south-east. In some cases, the weight of a 
westerner’s vote, in a district such as Warrego with 8,000 voters, reached four times 
that of someone in the South-East Zone, as in 32,000-voter Fassifern.14
Two further zones, the Provincial Cities Zone and the Country Zone, provided 
other opportunities for manipulation. By 1986 in the Provincial Cities Zone, which 
extended discontinuously up the coast and covered medium-sized cities containing 
Labor voters in abundance, the quota was close to that of the south-east 
(approximately 19,000 and 18,000 per district, respectively). A vote in the Country 
Zone (approximate quota 13,000) was not as heavily weighted as the average 
Western and Far Northern Zone vote (approximate quota 9,000). But the Country 
Zone, as its name suggests, was a redoubt of the Country/National Party, and its 
weighting guaranteed the party a rich harvest in terms of the number of seats.
The great curiosity of these schemes is that they were elaborate and 
thoroughgoing, though the standard reasons why governments try to conceal 
manipulation of electoral maps did not straightforwardly apply in Queensland’s 
case.
Electoral Necessity
Bjelke-Petersen’s popular support was such that the Coalition he led could win 
elections without having to rig electoral law.15 Certainly such manipulations raise 
the bar that oppositions must clear to take power, and weaken them through under-
representing them in parliament. Yet even this effect may be overstated. In 1986, 
the most suspicious gerrymander on the Queensland map involved the Indigenous 
12 Coaldrake (1978), pp 40–51.
13 See, for example, the discontiguous electorate of Cook: Coaldrake (1978), pp 39–41. 
14 Coaldrake (1978), pp 28–30. As it happened, both were National seats.
15 Mackerras (1990a), pp 250–58; Coaldrake (1978), p 54. 
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reserve of Wujal Wujal, positioned geographically outside the Cook electorate of 
which it was nominally part; this widely remarked discontiguity transferred just 84 
votes.16 Elaborately manipulated maps were notorious but mostly gratuitous — the 
conservatives would have prevailed in every election had they played the game 
straight.
One reason was Labor’s tendency in this era to self-handicap. It split during 
the Cold War into a union-based Australian Labor Party, and an anti-communist 
Democratic Labor Party and a related Queensland Labor Party. This split handed 
power to the Country Party-led Coalition at a time when Queensland was much less 
urbanised than it later came to be. The Labor opposition continued to squander 
energy and popular support on internal factional fighting, including several years of 
federal intervention, well into the 1980s. 
Legal Evasion
Manipulating electoral systems by stealth is often a way around laws that guarantee 
electoral fairness and equality. Gerrymandering is left as the tool of choice where 
malapportionment is infeasible because of a one vote, one value rule. Where one 
vote, one value mandates roughly equal numbers in electorates, a government still 
has the option to wend boundaries tortuously around demographic groups and 
voting blocks to bolster its prospects. The most blatant examples come from the 
United States, where the gerrymander was invented and perfected.17 The US 
Supreme Court enunciated a one vote, one value constitutional requirement in 
Reynolds v Sims in 1964, at the dawn of modern American judicial scrutiny of 
electoral systems.18 By mandating districts with generally equal populations, 
however, the court unintentionally set off further gerrymandering and a chain of 
inconclusive judicial interventions. 
Both gerrymandering and malapportionment also help evade voting and 
election guarantees enshrined in Bills of Rights, or written in anti-discrimination 
and fair voting legislation (such as the Voting Rights Act 1965 (US)).19 Both partisan 
methods cloak their motivations behind legitimate principles. For example, in 
drawing district boundaries, the principal legal mandate is to keep ‘communities of 
interest’ together.20 This, like nearly every other legitimate electoral map-making 
rule, is hopelessly malleable, relying on an open list of indistinct variables such as 
culture and history. Often, as well, a demographic enclave — for instance, an 
Indigenous settlement — is at once a community of interest and a coherent voting 
16 Mackerras (1990a), p 254. For an example of a work citing this gerrymander, see 
Coaldrake (1978), pp 39–41.
17 See, for example, ‘Note: A New Map’ (2004), pp 1196–97. 
18
Reynolds v Sims 377 US 533 (1964). The court first found electoral fairness justiciable 
in Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962). As in Bjelke-Petersen-era Queensland, ‘rural bias’ 
was ‘a practice common to American legislatures prior to the reapportionment
revolution of the 1960s’: Muir and Paddison (1981), p 106. 
19
Voting Rights Act 1965, 42 USC 1973aa–6. Voting and political candidacy rights are 
also constitutionally entrenched for all provincial and federal legislatures under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss 3–5, bringing both gerrymandering and 
malapportionment under judicial scrutiny. 
20 See, for example, EARC (November 1990), 13.35(a) (‘EARC Report’); AEC (1985).
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block. If so, it becomes difficult to distinguish between gerrymandering and 
legitimate efforts to concentrate the enclave within a single electorate.21
Similarly, partisans can malapportion under the cover of at least three 
legitimate rationales. First, parliamentarians in a sparsely populated polity like 
Australia face difficulties servicing geographically large electorates, especially in 
their ‘ombudsman’, problem-solving role.22 Containing electorate size is one classic 
justification for rural weighting. Second, zonal weighting advocates argue for 
equitable representation of regional voices.23 On this view, equality between regions 
is as valuable as equality between individual voters. This view is not meritless: it 
explains the grossly outsized influence of small states and provinces in the 
Australian, Canadian and US Senates.24 A third argument is that flexibility is 
required to fulfil democratic values other than one vote, one value, such as keeping 
communities of interest together. The one vote, one value rule, if applied strictly, 
cannot always accommodate entire communities. Canada recently provided a stark 
example. Many New Brunswick Acadians — members of a French community over 
400 years old — argued against a Federal Electoral Boundary Commission’s 
decision to transfer them to an Anglophone electorate.25 The court, describing the 
commission as unduly beholden to the one vote, one value principle, found for the 
Acadian activists.26
Usually there are relatively easy answers to the question of why governments
manipulate electoral maps. Partisan map-making can elude judicial scrutiny — not 
because judges cannot recognise partisanship, but because judges are bound by the 
rigidities of legal reasoning. Partisan manipulations remain effective because law 
can seldom capture the notions of partisanship and manipulation within coherent 
general rules. The task is complicated because necessarily vague general principles 
give apparently legitimate cover to manipulations.27
21 For US examples, see Karlan (1998), pp 733, 736; Lublin and McDonald (2006), p 147.
22 EARC Report (November 1990), 10.191, 10.29 and 13.29–13.30, citing ‘remoteness’. 
See similarly Ahern (1989), p 3. The evocative ‘ombudsman’ term comes out of the 
Canadian Supreme Court’s principal holding on the subject in Reference re Electoral 
Boundaries Commission Act (Saskatchewan) [1991] 2 SCR 158. Australia and Canada 
are uniquely useful comparators in that both employ the Westminster model in sparsely 
populated states and provinces many times larger than the model’s originator, England. 
23 Labor Premier Hanlon expressed this view in 1949: Coaldrake (1978), p 30. National 
Party Premier Ahern expressed the same view much later. Ahern (1989), p 2 (citing 
distinctive rural interests). See also Legislative Assembly of Queensland (Feb 1991), p 9 
(‘PCEARC Report’), citing ‘cultural and economic diversity’. 
24 This form of malapportionment by constitutional design reaches its apogee in the United 
States Senate, where Wyoming and California, having two Senate seats each, 
experience a 70-fold disparity of voter representation. 
25
Raîche v Canada (Attorney General) [2004] FC 679 at [54]–[65]. 
26 Similar large departures from one vote, one value in the United Kingdom accommodate 
‘geographic communities’. Wear (1990), pp 262–63.
27 Each decade after Reynolds, the US Supreme Court tried controlling the gerrymandering 
problem that it inadvertently helped create — enunciating, for example, a prohibition 
against any district ‘bizarre on its face’ in Shaw v Reno 509 US 630 (1993). In 1986, the 
Court in Davis v Bandemer 478 US 109 (1986) instructed lower courts to begin spotting 
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The problem of evading legal constraints did not, however, face Bjelke-
Petersen as it has confronted partisans elsewhere in jurisdictions with constitutional 
guarantees of political equality. While gerrymandering is often a partisan response 
to enforceable one vote, one value rules, Queensland law offered no such legal 
roadblocks. No Bill of Rights, nor any effective voting rights or anti-discrimination 
legislation, applied to limit the government to elaborate and indirect manipulations. 
There was no reason in law to hide partisan motivations from the courts. (It was 
only after the demise of Bjelke-Petersen that the High Court’s implied rights 
jurisprudence began to create even the potential to challenge electoral map 
manipulation.)28 Queensland had a statutory framework for judicial review of 
partisan boundaries, but this offered little resistance to political interference; the 
1985 Electoral Districts Act was less a constraint upon partisanship than a tool to 
give partisanship effect.29
Public Evasion
Lastly, could Bjelke-Petersen have meant to fool the public? On this theory, a 
government hides partisan motivations from public view to raise the bar for its 
opponents without incurring political costs. But this account is too simple and is 
ultimately unpersuasive in Queensland’s case. Bjelke-Petersen’s ministers all but 
acknowledged their electoral manipulations, and pursued methods characterised 
simultaneously by stealth and by a blunt frankness. Wells’ The Deep North,
published in 1979 long before the regime’s decline, has Cabinet member Russ 
Hinze admitting: ‘I told the premier, “If you want the boundaries rigged, let me do 
it and we’ll stay in power forever … In South Australia Steele Hall redistributed 
himself out of office. I don’t think you’ll be able to blame Joh or me for doing 
anything like that.”’30 Another time, the government’s media director, Allen 
Callaghan, quipped: ‘We feed the gerrymander at 3pm.’31
In electoral manipulations, the paradox of open deceit is a puzzling but 
recurring pattern. Canada’s pugnacious first Prime Minister, Sir John A Macdonald, 
is remembered partly for the gerrymander of 1882.32 According to historian Waite, 
Macdonald ‘follow[ed] the behests of the more exigent and greedy of his 
supporters, carving up Ontario in the most ruthless fashion for party advantage, and 
what is worse, taunting the Opposition at nearly every stage of the process’.33
partisanship directly, but after almost two decades of chequered success, in Vieth v 
Jubelirer 541 US 267 (2004) the court finally told lower judges that, while they could 
keep trying, succeeding at the task might be impossible.
28 But even then, in McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140, the High Court 
reiterated its ongoing refusal to imply one vote, one value into the constitutional 
structure of Australian states, as it had refused to do federally in A-G (Commonwealth); 
Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1.
29 Coaldrake (1978), p 39.
30 Wells (1979), p 87. Cabinet Minister Don Lane also allegedly bragged around 
parliament that he and another minister had drawn boundaries for the 1985 
redistribution: Paul Reynolds, personal communication with the authors.
31 Lunn (1978), p 97. 
32 MacGregor Dawson (1935).
33 Waite (1975–76), p 3.
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Hansard records one opposition Liberal member calling the redistribution an ‘Act 
to bull-doze the Liberal Party of Canada’,34 to which Macdonald admitted: ‘We 
meant to make you [Liberals] howl.’35 A much more recent gerrymander in Illinois 
eclipsed even this episode for its frankness. As reported (if censoriously) in 
litigation over the case, a Democratic election official declared to his opponents 
that: ‘We are going to shove … [this map] up your f------ ass and you are going to 
like it, and I’ll f--- any Republican I can.’36 Electoral manipulation also features 
cases notorious for being dramatic and egregious — obvious to all but the most 
disengaged voter.37
Bjelke-Petersen’s government was thus neither the first, nor the last, to engage 
in elaborate map-making charades, investing time and effort to manipulate the 
system indirectly, only then — bizarrely and incongruously — to acknowledge 
publicly their partisan intentions. His ministers were eager early adopters of 
computer technologies in the 1980s, allowing complex demographic analyses.38
Nevertheless, the partisanship under Bjelke-Petersen’s government remained 
overt.39 Chants of ‘gerrymander, gerrymander’ greeted him at some public events, 
particularly out of state.40 Despite the government’s elaborate methods, public
awareness that its stewardship of the electoral system served partisan interests was 
widespread. It could hardly have been otherwise, given the government’s obvious 
control of electoral commissioners; the occasionally bizarrely shaped, even 
discontiguous districts of the Queensland electoral map; and most of all the zonal 
weightings that to many — especially in urban centres — felt manifestly unfair. 
Public awareness was a given because the system was egregious and because 
government ministers spoke about their intentions all but openly.
Agrarian Chauvinismʼs Brittle Foundations
This general public awareness of the electoral system’s partisanship raises the 
question of why the government constructed an elaborate deceit that convinced 
almost no one, yet persisted for so long. One answer is that, rather than being an 
electoral or legal necessity, the malapportionment expressed a kind of rhetoric. In 
34 House of Commons (Canada) (1882), p 1409. 
35 House of Commons (Canada) (1882), pp 1489, see also p 1392.
36
Hulme v Madison County (2001) 188 F Supp 2d 1041 at 1051.
37 See, for example, the infamous Texas 25th congressional district, which ‘extended over 
a thin and ragged column from the city of Austin to the Mexican border 500 kilometres 
south’: Levy (2008), p 1.
38 Coaldrake (1978), pp 43–44. Similar practices were developing and becoming standard 
in politically polarised parts of the United States: Issacharoff (2002), p 624.
39 Many simpler methods for preserving incumbent power can be imagined. Governments 
might dispense with electoral commissions, hold elections less frequently, limit the 
number of candidates to a particular number, or — following the Queensland precedent 
— abolish a legislative house. 
40 Lunn (1978), p 101. Bjelke-Petersen came prepared to address this common chant. Out-
of-staters who acknowledged Queensland’s electoral rort included Prime Minister 
Whitlam, who called for ‘less vaudeville, less invective and less vote-rigging’ from 
Bjelke-Petersen: Lunn (1978), p 161.
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the right political setting and with the right handling, visibly undermining electoral 
laws and machinery can generate, rather than spend, political capital. Dramatic acts 
of gerrymandering and malapportionment have the benefit of being indirect and 
deceitful in form, but not in practice. These methods helped Bjelke-Petersen define 
a political movement for which a message of anti-democratic chauvinism was 
essential. 
Yet he could also invoke plausible deniability when he needed it. There was, 
first, an historical cover. The zonal weighting had been initiated by his Labor 
predecessors.41 This lent a sense that ‘everybody malapportions’. Second, a bare 
thread of legal cover also remained, to suggest propriety and avoid confronting the 
public too directly with its own complicity in the spell of the seduction. This 
required a complex rhetorical balancing, as the message was based on a 
contradiction. A carefully calibrated mixed message of respect and disdain for 
democratic and historical norms helped construct Bjelke-Petersen’s agrarian 
chauvinism as the movement rightfully in control of Queensland and its 
government. 
All governments end, however, and in cases such as Bjelke-Petersen’s, they 
end not because of a gradual rise in opposition support but a dramatic reversal in 
electoral fortunes. On its eventual decline, even long-standing support for strong-
man governments can fall away quickly. The reversal is delayed as long as enough 
of those in the electorate pretend not to notice the manipulation — viewing 
themselves as on side with the winners in the game. (On the other side, for those 
excluded by the mirage of an agrarian, demographically homogenous, superior 
Queensland, there was seething resentment.) Bjelke-Petersen therefore relied on the 
support of a complicit majority.42 Indeed, when the Queensland Liberals tried to 
distinguish themselves in 1983, on the termination of the Coalition agreement and 
asserting more liberal values (such as electoral reform), they were electorally 
punished for threatening the stability of the natural order personified in the strong-
man Bjelke-Petersen.
But chauvinistic rhetoric can be rather divorced from substantive ideas and 
specific policy,43 and reflect only the most basic in-group/out-group public 
psychology. A political movement like Bjelke-Petersen’s is therefore brittle from 
41 A socially conservative party, Queensland Labor was popular in rural areas when 
agricultural labour was a significant element of the state’s economy.
42 The PCEARC Report cites public submissions to the EARC accusing the media and 
public for failing to remain vigilant against electoral manipulation: PCEARC Report, 
pp 14–15. The possibility of public acquiescence in Bjelke-Petersen’s electoral 
stratagems offers grist for recent arguments that partisan efforts to rewrite election laws 
are self-limiting or even, in their own way, democratic. See, for example, Persily 
(2002). Such (ultimately unconvincing) arguments lie beyond the scope of this article.
43 Coaldrake notes that Bjelke-Petersen dismissed electoral reform as ‘hooha’ or ‘trendy’, 
and his government often refused even to acknowledge criticisms levelled against it. As 
an opposition backbencher, Bjelke-Petersen delivered a denunciation of Labor’s 
malapportioned zones as ‘mean[ing] nothing but that the majority will be ruled by the 
minority’, evidencing a breathtaking hypocrisy in light of later events. Coaldrake 
(1978), pp 2–5, 31.
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the strains of holding together its rhetorical contradictions.44 Given so personalised a 
message, which invited public identification with the movement,45 when the 
government came into disgrace there was a rapid public flight from it. 46 The rot first 
set in as Bjelke-Petersen over-reached during his period of one-party government. 
He unsuccessfully sought to leverage his movement into the federal arena. This 
merely undermined his state-nationalist message at home and exposed his hubris 
nationwide. More problematically, and in the tradition of strong-man leaders, he 
was soon ordering capricious ministerial purges.47 In the process, he exposed his 
movement as less one of Queensland chauvinism than of one man’s banal egoism. 
The rot then turned to flight and things unravelled relatively quickly in the wake of 
the scandals Fitzgerald uncovered. As allegations emerged, supporters moved to 
distance themselves. 
Partisan strangleholds relying on electoral manipulation therefore eventually 
unravel. An important question is why such efforts do not preserve their designers 
indefinitely — and indeed, why some collapse in dramatic fashion. We might 
distinguish between the ‘numerical-legal’ and the ‘rhetorical’ models of electoral 
manipulation. Of course, few real-world cases hew entirely to either of these two 
extremes. Simplifying somewhat, however, the latter model involves mastery of the 
manufacture of an anti-democratic rhetoric according to which partisan map-
making expresses and helps create electoral dominance and success. Departing from 
the conventional view, then, manipulated maps may have neither significant legal 
effect nor narrow numerical electoral effects, but can play a longer-term and no less 
potent political role. 
Electoral Manipulation and Reform in the Lands of Other Agrarian 
Strongmen
The ʻPlaymanderʼ: Rural Malapportionment in South Australia
South Australia provides the most relevant native analogue to Queensland’s 
experience. From 1933 until 1965, the conservative Liberal and Country League 
governed South Australia (curiously the same length of time for which 
conservatives lorded it over the Labor Party in Queensland). Political scientists 
disagree as to the actual effect of South Australia’s rural malapportionment, in part 
because many seats were uncontested in that era. But the system denied Labor 
office when it attracted over 50 per cent of the two-party preferred vote at anywhere 
between a couple and half a dozen elections.48 Unlike Queensland in the 1960, 
1970s and 1980s, the South Australian manipulation was an electoral necessity.
44 Long before Bjelke-Petersen manifested the observation, Weber wrote of the ‘sudden 
inner collapse’ of politics founded upon ‘boastful but entirely empty’ gestures: Weber 
(1946), p 116.
45 Walter (1990), p 304.
46 Williams (1999), p 145. Further on the political demise of Bjelke-Petersen, see 
Reynolds (2003).
47 Coaldrake (1978), pp 16–19.
48 Playford (1982), p 64; cf Blewett and Jaensch (1971), Ch 2.
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Like Queensland, South Australia is geographically large, with a 
predominantly coastal population. However, there are three salient differences. 
First, South Australia had a united conservative party; Queensland’s 
malapportionment helped Bjelke-Petersen keep the urban Liberals in place. Second, 
South Australia’s rural weighting was purely a creation of the conservative side of 
politics, which amended the state Constitution in 1936 so that it ‘allocated only one-
third of the House of Assembly’s 39 seats to metropolitan Adelaide, a zone which 
contained over 60 per cent of the state’s population’.49 This system was dubbed the 
‘Playmander’50 after Tom Playford, who reigned as Premier for over 26 years. 
Third, as Paul Reynolds has observed, South Australia’s demographics have more 
in common with Western Australia (whose elections also, until recently, 
incorporated significant rural weightage).51 Those states are large, but with a 
population centred in a single urban area in their capital city. Queensland, however, 
was significantly decentralised, through a strip of east coast provincial cities. 
Nevertheless, both demographies were used to justify rural weightage: South 
Australian conservatives cited tyranny of distance and fear of Adelaide’s 
dominance; Queensland conservatives appealed to the state’s diversified 
communities and regions.
There were distinct similarities between South Australia’s Playford and 
Queensland’s Bjelke-Petersen. They shared puritanical backgrounds, early farming 
careers, little formal education and a resulting distrust of intellectuals.52 In politics, 
they both played on their apparently simple mien and homespun language and 
philosophies. To supporters, they possessed the common touch and had but one 
public ambition: the economic development of their state53 — even if that involved 
corporatism and cronyism. To detractors, their rule was authoritarian; even a 
relatively friendly biography of Playford is subtitled ‘The Benevolent Despot’.54
They maintained iron grips over party, parliament and civil liberties, and identified 
themselves with the state and a parochial construction of ‘the people’. But there 
were differences. Playford was more urbane and genial, having come from a line of 
influential ‘Tom Playfords’, including a grandfather who had been Premier and a 
federal parliamentarian.
What makes the demise of the ‘Playmander’ remarkable is that it occurred 
without the trauma of a Royal Commission or even a major scandal. Unlike Bjelke-
49 Stock (1992), p 331. The average ratio of city seat enrolments to those in the country 
was three to one, and at worst nine to one: Blewett and Jaensch (1971), p 185. Dean 
Jaensch described the system as both the ‘most retarded’ and as the ‘zenith’ of all 
Australian malapportionments: Jaensch (1981). For redistribution history in South 
Australia, see Jaensch (2002), Ch 13.
50 It was not a gerrymander involving rigged individual boundaries, but a two-zonal 
system significantly weighting country over city votes. Jaensch attributes the term to 
fellow political scientist, later federal Labor minister, Neal Blewett: Jaensch (1970), 
p 101.
51 Robinson (2003), p 100; Kelly (2006).
52 On Playford’s early life, see Cockburn (1991), Chs 2–4 and Crocker (1983), Chs 2–4.
53 Playford through industrial development; Bjelke-Petersen through mining and tourism.
54 Cockburn (1991).
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Petersen, the strong-man Playford slipped into retirement after his sole electoral 
loss in 1965. Labor managed victory in 1965 in spite of the malapportionment. So, 
for all its electoral efficacy, the Playmander — like Queensland’s 
malapportionment in 1989 — proved beatable. The Liberal and Country League 
then turned to Raymond Steele Hall, a youngish man who, despite his farming 
background, was of liberal bent.55
Steele Hall led the League back into government in 1968, but was haunted by 
the fact that the Labor Party had outpolled it 52 per cent to 43.8 per cent on primary 
votes alone.56 As a part of a modernising agenda, in 1969 Steele Hall legislated to 
increase the number of urban members of the House of Assembly. The two-to-one 
ratio of country to city seats was replaced with a 28:19 ratio in favour of city seats.57
Steele Hall certainly faced popular clamour for reform.58 But he adopted it in 
an entirely principled way and despite internal opposition, especially from his
Upper House colleagues. One, a knight of the realm, likened the weakening of rural 
malapportionment to ‘the rape of the country districts … pregnant with ill 
possibilities for the future of country people’.59 Instead, Steele Hall made a virtuous 
point of reform, going ‘out of his way to make it clear that he did not wish to be 
elected … by way of the “Playmander”’.60
It is difficult to imagine a Queensland National Party Premier making such a 
principled stand. Even Bjelke-Petersen’s successor, Mike Ahern, at first showed no 
interest in electoral reform.61 A movement so wedded to the identification of 
country with Queensland could not reinvent itself as easily as Steele Hall could 
modernise his party to identify with metropolitan Adelaide. Queensland simply 
lacked an effectual Liberal Party. In Queensland, the task of legislating electoral 
reform fell to the Labor Party in the wake of Fitzgerald’s findings.62 Thus, while 
55 Steele Hall would soon prove his liberal credentials by splitting from the Liberal Party 
and forming a ‘Liberal Movement’, which took him to the Senate cross-benches and 
was a forerunner of the centrist Australian Democrats. See further, Steele Hall et al 
(1973). He later returned to the Liberal Party fold as a federal MHR.
56 Blewett and Jaensch (1971), p 155.
57 The Labor proposal was to reverse the 2:1 ratio. For an account of the process of the 
reform, see Blewett and Jaensch (1971), pp 185–88.
58 Blewett and Jaensch (1971), pp 172–73 chronicles reform pressure in the wake of the 
1968 election coming from the press, union movement and a public rally of over 10 000
people.
59 Jaensch (2002), p 180. See also Blewett and Jaensch (1971), pp 185–87.
60 Crocker (1983), p 118.
61 Indeed, he commented at his first press conference that electoral reform was ‘not on the 
agenda’: Paul Reynolds, personal communication with authors. Under pressure, Ahern’s 
successor, Russell Cooper, proposed a last-minute Bill to hold the 1989 election under 
reformed boundaries, but this was withdrawn. (Cooper’s Premiership lasted just six 
weeks.)
62 Labor was also crucial in South Australia. Steele Hall did not introduce one vote, one 
value fully. For his efforts, he lost the ensuing election to an even more reformist Labor 
Premier, Don Dunstan. In 1976, Dunstan completed the transition to one vote, one 
value, entrenching it under an independent electoral and redistribution commission: 
Jaensch (1981), pp 230–37. In 1991, this was augmented by a ‘fair elections’ rule 
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there are analogies between Playford and Bjelke-Petersen, the South Australian 
experience of reform was more evolutionary.
The Québec Experience: Malapportionment and Nationalism
In electoral matters, our immorality [is] truly scabby. Such and such a 
habitant [Québécois commoner], who would be ashamed to enter a brothel, 
sells his conscience at every election for a bottle of whiskey blanc. Such and 
such a lawyer, who demands the maximum sentence for robbery of church 
poor-boxes, thinks nothing of adding two thousand fictitious names to the 
voters’ lists.63
Pierre Trudeau wrote these condemning words in 1952, with his tenure as Canada’s 
Prime Minister still 16 years away. In the 1950s, Trudeau and others led an 
emerging class of Québécois intellectuals and labour leaders who were developing 
new, liberal ideals in response to a repressive provincial regime.64 With the regime’s 
fall by decade’s end, similar ideals flourished in the cultural transformations of 
Québec’s Quiet Revolution. 
The strong-man of the ancien régime was Maurice Duplessis, an abstemious, 
pious and uncommonly hard-working Premier who identified completely with his 
province, and who in turn commanded popular support and remained in office for 
18 years, from 1936 to 1959 (interrupted in 1939–44). So similar were his qualities 
and his methods of governance to Bjelke-Petersen’s a generation later that the latter 
gives an impression of having studied the techniques of his Québécois forerunner. 
First, both men dominated jurisdictions characterised by vast distances for which 
they promised development, and by sizeable agrarian populations with which they 
claimed identification.65
Second, each premier practised an effective populist oratory that, while 
generally empty of substantive detail, often included messages of robust and heavy-
handed opposition to communism and organised labour.66 Admittedly, in Québec 
revolutions and upheaval abroad were recent memories and more plausible 
continuing threats. The communist scare gave the pretext for Duplessis’ Padlock 
Law, which authorities used to shutter premises where ‘subversive’ meetings were 
held.67 This and Duplessis’ harsh rules for labour ‘were imposed to create an 
antisubversive envelope around Québec’.68 The foreshadowing of Bjelke-Petersen’s 
requiring redistributions to model election outcomes to try to ensure that 50 per cent of 
the two-party vote should translate into 50 per cent of the seats: Constitution Act 1934
(SA), s 83(1).
63 Trudeau (1952), p 53, quoted and translated by Behiels (1985), p 220.
64 Rocher (2002), p 2.
65 Cuccioletta and Lubin (2003–04), p 130. To be sure, quoting Behiels, Cuccioletta and
Lubin suggest that the image of an ‘agricultural society outside of the mainstream of the 
urban-industrial North American way of life’ was exaggerated.
66 Laporte (1960), pp 22–23.
67 Egerton (2004), p 6.
68 Cuccioletta and Lubin (2003–04), p 127.
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crackdown on public protest, assembly and unions is difficult to miss. Indeed, 
Duplessis also exercised an attachment to and control over the police force69 —
similar to habits that seeded Bjelke-Petersen’s troubles with Fitzgerald. 
Third, along with agrarian and anti-communist chauvinism, Duplessis 
exploited federalism to pitch a staunchly anti-central government message, going 
several steps beyond the usual bickering endemic to federations.70 Curiously, 
however, it is Bjelke-Petersen who seems to have spoken more often of 
Queensland’s secession from federation than Duplessis ever did of Québec’s.71
But there were also major differences of approach. Notably, only Duplessis 
relied on an explicit alliance of (Catholic) Church and state.72 Québec’s deep 
‘clericalism’ meant that the church dominated private and public life in the 
province. Québec, which had been the most socially conservative and pious corner 
of Canada, quickly became the country’s most cosmopolitan and atheistic in the 
1960s after Duplessis. In contrast, from the outset Bjelke-Petersen learned to steer 
away from his ‘arch-wowser image’.73 If both men were known as driven by 
religious conviction, only in Queensland was this a potential liability.74
In Duplessis-era Québec, as in Bjelke-Petersen’s Queensland, there was a 
tendency to overstate the population’s rural quotient. Québec was an agrarian 
province, but not overwhelmingly so: one-third of Québécois lived outside of cities 
and towns. It was only Québec’s malapportionment that made it, electorally 
speaking, a rural province. Two-thirds of seats in the provincial legislature were in 
country locations.75 Duplessis’ Union Nationale Party in turn drew 90 per cent of its 
elected members from country seats.76 Rural development — electrification, road 
building and the like — was therefore perennially a plank in the party platform. 
Duplessis also benefited from the permanent ‘linguistic gerrymander’ through no 
effort of his own. By Massicotte’s estimate, the distribution of minority English 
speakers in Québec has given all French nationalist parties — of which there have 
been many — a five to seven percentage point boost over opponents.77 Finally, 
favourable boundaries combined with a barely disguised and thoroughgoing system 
of government patronage of business to buffer Union Nationale power. The party 
fought the 1956 election by spending $15 million — high in modern dollars, but 
69 Cuccioletta and Lubin (2003–04), p 126.
70 Oliver (1999), pp 532–36.
71 Lunn (1978), p 257. Secession talk would dominate later Québec Premiers’ agendas. 
72 Egerton (2004), p 5. There were notable cracks in the alliance: for example, many 
progressive members of the church hierarchy supported striking workers in one of 
Canada’s seminal labour disputes, the clash at Asbestos, Québec in 1949. See Fay and 
Fay (2002), p 249.
73 Lunn (1978), pp 70–71; see also Wear (2002).
74 Another difference was that Québec had a Legislative Council until 1968 — in theory, 
an extra roadblock to autocracy. But during the Duplessis era, the upper house’s 24 
members, appointed by the Premier, predominantly belonged to his Union Nationale 
Party. 
75 Behiels (1985), p 222.
76 Behiels (1985), p 222.
77 Massicotte (1994), pp 227–44. 
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truly astonishing in the currency of the time.78 From 1944 to 1959, Union Nationale 
was undefeated and undefeatable.
Yet electoral manipulation was unnecessary, at least in a narrow sense. If the 
popular vote count is to be believed, then Duplessis in fact bested Bjelke-Petersen 
by securing outright majorities, such as 52 per cent in 1948. While Duplessis’ party 
lost power for the span of the war, its vast electoral war chest and successful mining 
of the nationalist vote produced quietly unbroken rule for 15 years thereafter. And if 
electoral calculations did not therefore necessitate Duplessis’ dramatic 
malapportionment, neither for the most part did the law in Canada before the advent 
of the Canadian Charter in 1982 or the quasi-constitutional Québec Charter in 1976. 
In addition, like the electoral commissions that did not limit, but rather fulfilled, 
Bjelke-Petersen’s electoral stratagems, similar Duplessis-era commissions were 
independent only in name.79 In later years, Duplessis’ heavy-handed action against 
communists and religious non-conformists prompted rebukes by the Supreme Court 
of Canada; Roncarelli v Duplessis remains Canada’s celebrated pre-Charter holding 
on individual freedoms.80 But legal and institutional constraints still fell well short 
of blocking electoral manipulation. Like Bjelke-Petersen’s, Duplessis’ rural 
weightage was therefore both numerically and legally gratuitous.
While Bjelke-Petersen built a political movement upon a rhetoric of unity of 
Queensland interests, in Québec — where the tradition of nationalism is older and 
centres around more serious cleavages of history, law and culture — a similar effect 
should have been easier to achieve. And so it was. A collectivist ethos led many in 
the province to eschew electoral liberalisation. Like Bjelke-Petersen’s complicit 
public supporters, Duplessis-era nationalists and clericalists in Québec therefore 
held righting electoral dysfunction and corruption low among their priorities. ‘Out 
of historical necessity and a devotion to cultural survival French Canadians had 
learned quickly to use democracy rather than to adhere to it as a political creed.’81
Duplessis therefore managed to construct a role of ‘Master after God’.82 Québec’s 
upside-down electoral laws helped ensure this, most of all through the rhetoric of 
political dominance expressed in them.
Ultimately, in Québec we see again the pattern of long-lasting but brittle 
support that finally crumbles. A flood of corruption stories figured in the events 
leading to the leader’s fall from grace. And again it fell to regime insiders — in this 
case, a duo of reformist priests83 — to challenge the entrenched corruption. 
78 Behiels (1985), p 223. The Liberal opposition spent $275,000.
79 Ryan (1967), p 152.
80
Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121. Roncarelli was a Jehovah’s Witness barred 
from distributing proselytising leaflets. The decision paralleled the Australian High
Court’s take on arbitrary power in Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth
(1951) 83 CLR 1. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled against the Padlock Law in 
Switzman v Elbling [1957] SCR 285.
81 Behiels (1985), p 232.
82 Behiels (1985), p 222. Duplessis’ phrase drew on provincial foundation myths: he 
seems to have appropriated it from the explorers of New France. See, for example, 
Legaré and Kaplansky (2004), p 31.
83 Hébert (1991).
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Interestingly, in Duplessis’ case the first allegations of corruption to gain traction 
were electoral. Broader revelations of corruption quickly emerged, as Québec 
followed the script of cascading scandal familiar to Queenslanders three decades 
later. The scripts depart from each other, however, at Duplessis’ sudden death in 
1959 at the height of the controversy. Unlike the Fitzgerald process, the Salvas 
Commission of inquiry into electoral corruption, struck in 1960 under the newly 
elected Québec Liberals, therefore played no role in hounding Duplessis from 
office. But the commission may have helped inaugurate the liberalisations of the 
Quiet Revolution as, in the words of one watcher of Duplessis’ decline, ‘shame 
[became] the beginning of wisdom’.84
Duplessis’ Québec again suggests how a gerrymander or malapportionment is 
effective while its message establishes anti-democratic laws as normative, even 
virtuous, and how successful — albeit brittle — political entrenchment can turn on 
the rhetorical dimensions of electoral law. But it is also worth noting what Québec 
suggests about Queensland. Duplessis, like Bjelke-Petersen, married electoral 
manipulations with his government’s other chauvinist expressions. This must have 
been easier in still-illiberal, nationalist and clericalist Québec. But even without 
Duplessis’ more credible communist bogeyman, Bjelke-Petersen still managed to 
win elections in part by running against the canard of Whitlamite communism.85
More surprising still, Bjelke-Petersen — unlike Duplessis — worked a nationalist 
pitch on a population neither historically aggrieved nor linguistically distinct. The 
clericalist angle was also absent. The Québec case therefore highlights the 
rhetorical mastery of Bjelke-Petersen — a leader who achieved similar results under 
what should have been far less fertile conditions. 
How Change was Wrought
This article opened with the question of how the brushfires of police corruption 
spread to not just consume a 32-year-old administration, but to generate from its 
ashes a rewriting of public law.
The metaphor of fire may mislead. It suggests a tinder-dry political 
atmosphere, whipped by hostile winds and a raging process. Instead, the process of 
legal change during and after the regime’s collapse was more a ‘Quiet Revolution’: 
elongated and orderly. More than five years passed between the first Order-in-
Council constituting the Fitzgerald Inquiry and the enactment of the new electoral 
code.86 The first two years were taken up with the Inquiry proceedings and report-
writing,87 and the last three years with extensive EARC hearings and deliberations 
84
Le Devoir editor André Laurendeau, quoted in Behiels (1985), p 230.
85 Lunn (1978), p 200.
86 From the Order-in-Council of 26 May 1987 to the Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), assented to 
on 1 June 1992.
87 Culminating in the blandly titled Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders 
in Council (29 September 1989) (‘Fitzgerald Report’). The Commission formally styled 
itself as the ‘Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated 
Police Misconduct’.
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followed by parliamentary review and implementation of its recommendations for a 
new boundary system in an overhauled electoral code.88
Nor is a fire metaphor apt in implying the presence of oxygen. If anything, a 
vacuum was at the heart of the process. The longevity of the Bjelke-Petersen 
administration, and his autocratic populism,89 belied its eventual weariness and 
hollowness. The party and its leader had over-extended themselves. The former had 
become internally divided. The latter, as strong-men must, had lost some of his 
political virility.90 A profound, if latent mismatch had evolved between Bjelke-
Petersen’s provocative and sometimes repressive political rhetoric, sideshows and 
identification with a provincial zeitgeist on the one hand, and the rapid development 
and urbanisation of South-East Queensland on the other. Ironically, his 
government’s policies had been one stimulant to that development.
Although it was not clear at the time, in retrospect the government was a house 
of cards. The unfolding revelations of police and ministerial misconduct, overseen 
by an ageing and previously unchallenged administration, provided the pretext for 
liberal reforms in the guise of improving governmental accountability.
The key events in the Fitzgerald Inquiry itself were not any particular 
revelations of corruption, but Fitzgerald’s ability to widen the inquiry’s scope. The 
original terms of reference narrowly focused on particular police corruption 
allegations (although, suggestively, one allegation named a specific political 
donation from vice figures).91
Concerned that the inquiry’s future was presumed to be brief and ineffectual, 
and a suspicion that the police and justice departments wanted to control it, 
Fitzgerald sought assurances for its integrity. He found an ally in Acting Premier 
Gunn — who was acting in Bjelke-Petersen’s absence overseas. Gunn opened the 
government to the inquiry and funded it properly. Its terms of reference were twice 
expanded, by August 1988 to ‘Any other matter or thing appertaining to [vice and 
police corruption] or concerning possible criminal activity, neglect or violation of 
duty, or official misconduct or impropriety the inquiry into which to you shall seem 
meet and proper in the public interest’.92 Shorn of the flourishes, this was a wide 
charter. 
In Fitzgerald’s own metaphor, he was ‘pulling a few threads at the frayed 
edges of society [but to] general alarm, sections of the fabric began to unravel’.93 By 
1988, he had the evidence that — like the proverbial rotting fish — corruption 
permeated through the highest levels of government, both personal corruption 
(eg ministerial bribes) and corruption of processes (such as official appointments).
In effect, Fitzgerald had become an ad hoc Independent Commission Against 
Corruption. By this time, the Nationals had replaced Bjelke-Petersen with a milder 
88
Electoral Amendment Act 1994 (Qld), assented to on 1 December 1994. A further two 
and a half years elapsed before the political finance system was enacted.
89 To borrow from the subtitle of James Walter’s (1990) account.
90 Emblemised most clearly in his Quixotic and ill-fated ‘Joh for PM’ campaign to enter
federal politics in 1987.
91 Fitzgerald (1989) A26 (second term of reference) and p 18.
92 Fitzgerald (1989), A 29, emphasis added.
93 Fitzgerald (1989), p 4.
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Premier, Mike Ahern.94 But the rot had set in and, as earlier described, many of 
those who had explicitly and tacitly supported the movement were reawakening to a 
more liberal and less chauvinistic reality.
In considering governance issues, Fitzgerald realised the problems were not 
merely situational or episodic. They were not merely the product of a particular bad 
executive or police force. Rather, they had been entrenched in, if not bred by, a 
system of public laws and conventions that failed to promote accountability. 
Fitzgeraldʼs Treatment of the Malapportionment
Part 3.3 of the Fitzgerald Report deals with ‘Electoral Laws’, although it is just a 
page in length.95 Fitzgerald began with the observation that a ‘fundamental tenet of 
… parliamentary democracy is … regular, free, fair elections following open 
debate’. Queensland certainly had ‘regular’ elections. Indeed, they occurred like 
clockwork: 11 in the 32 years between the last Labor government and the Fitzgerald 
Report.96 But, by implication, the ‘free [and] fair’ elections criteria were not being 
met.97
Careful not to condemn the system in its totality — after all, he had not 
inquired directly into the electoral system — Fitzgerald merely noted that electoral 
fairness had been ‘widely questioned’. In particular ‘electoral boundaries … are 
seen as distorted in favour of the present Government, so as to allow it to retain 
power with minority support’.98 What had been notorious but natural under the 
agrarian populism personified by Bjelke-Petersen was becoming the new anathema. 
Then, speaking directly, Fitzgerald wrote:
Irrespective of the correctness of this view, the dissatisfaction … is magnified 
by the system under which electoral boundaries are determined. It has not 
always been obvious that the Electoral Commissioners were independent of 
the Government …
There is a vital need for the existing boundaries to be examined by an 
open, independent inquiry as a first step in the rehabilitation of social 
cohesion, public accountability and respect for authority …
The Elections Act 1983–85 should be similarly reviewed in an impartial 
manner …99
94 ‘Replaced’ does no justice to the machinations involved: see, for example, Wear (2002).
95 Fitzgerald (1989), pp 127–28.
96 To Bjelke-Petersen’s credit, he only once used the Westminster prerogative of calling 
an early election to take advantage of his rival’s disarray, although such disarray was 
not uncommon.
97 In relation to ‘open’ elections — that is, free political discourse — he spent some time 
critiquing three bullying tactics by the executive government: media management, the 
use of ‘stop-writs’ in defamation, and the heavy-handed and politicised use of policing 
to inflame public protest in the guise of repressing it. Fitzgerald (1989), pp 141–43. For 
a perspective on the latter, see Brennan (1983), Chs 4 and 5.
98 Fitzgerald (1989), p 127.
99 Fitzgerald (1989), p 127.
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In short, without arguing a necessary link between the electoral system, 
broader accountability and the corruption he had unearthed, Fitzgerald deftly 
aligned the three issues and rationalised a complete review of electoral legislation, 
with a focus on redistributions and the zonal system. He did not have to attempt a 
comprehensive justification. Although the Elections Act had, as its title suggests, 
last been overhauled just six years earlier, there was now a general public 
acceptance that the game of electoral manipulation was up. 
Fitzgerald recognised that ‘public sittings of this Inquiry could have gone on 
indefinitely’. But rather than set himself up as a permanent Star Chamber, he 
reported by June 1989 to commence stage two, a ‘comprehensive reform’ process. 
A key part of this process was the EARC, a medium-term venture with a broad 
remit to draft reforms of public law generally and electoral law in particular. While 
the EARC would conduct its work in a more low-key way than an inquiry focused 
on corruption, its impact would be no less significant.
Fitzgerald’s role in this, however, is not just as a midwife: he was sine qua 
non. While elite opinion, the labour movement and small ‘l’ liberals had clamoured 
for electoral reform, the popular consensus — and indeed the mainstream media —
were too dependent on, and even in thrall of, the agrarian strong-man and his tricks 
to see such reform as fundamentally necessary. With Bjelke-Petersen’s downfall 
and the National Party government losing legitimacy through daily revelations of 
police and ministerial corruption, a power vacuum developed. It was filled by 
neither the (well-meaning) new Premier Ahern, nor the Labor opposition, which 
was still reinventing itself under a new leader, Wayne Goss, and preparing for the 
election. Thus, in the stead of a government headed by an agrarian populist, another 
strong-man emerged in the form of the urbane QC Tony Fitzgerald.
Delegating Reform to the EARC
In relation to electoral reform, Fitzgerald executed a manoeuvre which was to be 
the hallmark of his report. He did not offer detailed reform proposals, but identified 
areas of perceived lack, and delegated reform to a new body. Fitzgerald had been a 
judge and barrister, but his expertise was not in public, let alone electoral, law. For 
public as opposed to criminal law, he sketched a brief for the EARC.100 Why did he 
not leave reform to existing processes? The most obvious answer was that leaving 
electoral reform to a malapportioned and self-interested body like the unicameral 
Queensland legislature was a Catch 22.101 Fitzgerald also explicitly criticised other 
Queensland law reform processes as reactive, if not moribund.102
Of the tasks Fitzgerald set for the EARC, only two of 16 related to electoral 
democracy per se, namely electoral system review (with an emphasis on 
boundaries) and a donations register. The rationale for entrusting electoral reform to 
a body otherwise focused on reshaping administrative law and procedures was the 
presumption that electoral fairness was essential to accountability. The EARC was 
100 Fitzgerald (1989), pp 144–45.
101 In comparison, the federal law was overhauled in 1983 with input from a joint select 
committee.
102 Fitzgerald (1989), pp 138–41.
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established by Parliament and required ‘forthwith’ to review the electoral maps and 
apportionment system.103
The EARC was no mere ad hoc law reform body, of the sort to which 
questions are shunted to put them on a back-burner. On the contrary, the EARC had 
enormous power for two reasons. One was by virtue of its conception, in the 
twinkling of Commissioner Fitzgerald’s all-seeing eye. The second was:
an extraordinary pre-election agreement by the leaders of all Parliamentary 
parties with Mr Fitzgerald QC on the 21st July 1989 that ‘all 
recommendations of [EARC] with respect to electoral matters will be 
immediately implemented’.
104
This pledge, which occurred several months before the election that ushered in a 
Labor government, was politically extraordinary. It mirrored Premier Ahern’s public 
commitment to implement the Fitzgerald reforms ‘lock, stock and barrel’.105 Through
it, the National Party was effectively committing to the end of the zonal system —
although Ahern must have suspected the task would not fall to him, but to a Labor-
or Liberal-led government. (For his troubles, Ahern was ousted in September 1989 
by Russell Cooper, who led the National administration to defeat fewer than three 
months later.) The pledge was also extraordinary because it implied ceding 
parliamentary sovereignty over the electoral system to a body that was not merely 
unelected, but yet to be created. 
The EARC’s legislative mandate was simultaneously remarkable for both its 
breadth and its narrowness.106 As Professor Colin Hughes, a leading author of the
electoral reforms, has since observed, its mandate’s ‘prohibition of the particular 
and confinement to the general’ helped its authority and focus.107 It was broad in 
encompassing any aspect of the electoral process, particularly given that the 
electoral code had been overhauled as recently as 1983. Yet it was narrow in that 
the question of reinstating an upper house — or the more general question of 
democratic means to address the subordination of parliament to a powerful 
executive — was not placed on its agenda. 
In relation to electoral map-making, EARC recommended the system that 
survives to this day:108
• an independent Electoral Commission,
• reconstituted as a three-member Redistribution Commission consisting of 
a judge and the Electoral Commissioner and the Surveyor-General,109
103
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission Act 1989 (Qld), s 2.11. For the 
EARC’s general remit, see ss 2.9–2.12 and Schedule.
104 PCEARC Report, p iii. The agreement, as tabled in Parliament, is Appendix D(1) to that 
report.
105 Reynolds (2002).
106
Electoral and Administrative Review Commission Act.
107 Personal communication with authors.
108 EARC Report (November 1990), Chs 11 and 12. See Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), ss 4–5, 
7, 9 and Part 3.
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• conducting regular redistributions,
• to achieve one vote, one value, with a maximum tolerance of 10 per cent 
from the average quota,
• but with a limited weightage for any electorates over 100,000 km2.
The EARC’s report was then considered by a specialist Parliamentary 
Committee for Electoral and Administrative Review (PCEARC).110 Both in this 
forum and on the floor of parliament, Labor MPs felt a clash of principle and 
honour. Their principles and long-held policy brooked no watering down of one 
vote, one value, but their leader, in a pact to depoliticise the process of electoral
reform, had pledged to honour the outcomes of the Fitzgerald process. In the end, 
honour won over principle.111 As a result, a few vast and remote electorates have 
‘phantom’ voters attributed to them at the rate of 2 per cent of their size in square 
kilometres.112
In relation to its broad remit to redraft the electoral code, the EARC 
recommended a new voting system in the form of optional preferential voting. It did 
so on the basis of democratic principle: optional preferential voting increases voter 
choice.113 This decision was unexpected, but optional preferential voting had been 
used in Queensland before.114 Its political effects have proved surprisingly muted. 
Labor exploited optional preferential voting when conservative politics fractured 
again in the late 1990s, with the emergence of the One Nation Party, by
campaigning on a ‘Vote 1’ strategy. (The strategy was disingenuous: Labor 
preferences were almost never counted.)115 But by 2008, the major conservative 
parties had united into a single Liberal National Party. At the time of writing, Labor 
has been in power all but two of the 20 years since the Fitzgerald Report. If 
anything, it is Labor that is now dependent on preferences, from left-wing voters 
whose votes have been lost to the Greens.116
The EARC also held a distinct public investigation into political donations.117
Its recommendations were not considered until the second term of the new Labor 
109 Although the EARC itself was to conduct the first redistribution under a zone-free 
system, to ensure fair boundaries were available in time for the 1992 election. See 
Electoral Districts Act 1991 (Qld). 
110 PCEARC Report. This Committee was established alongside EARC: EARC Act, Pt V.
111 PCEARC Report, p iii (‘the members of this Committee are honour bound to give effect 
to the historic tri-partisan agreement’). Nevertheless, the committee recommended 
machinery amendments. 
112 For example, an electorate of 110,000 km2 could fall 2200 electors short of the 
minimum quota.
113 EARC Report (November 1990), Ch 6, especially paras 6.19–6.25.
114 ‘Contingent’ voting had been pioneered in Queensland from 1892 until 1942. Optional 
preferential voting has also become the system used in New South Wales elections.
115 Wanna (2004).
116 This effect can be over-stated, since the Queensland Greens are not strong and their 
supporters mostly reflexively preference Labor: see Reynolds (2009). Analysis suggests 
that the ‘exhaustion’ of preferences under optional preferential voting does not affect 
the outcome in many seats.
117 EARC (June 1992).
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government.118 The resulting campaign finance system was limited to public 
disclosure of four-figure donations and a scheme of partial public funding of the 
cost of electioneering. It simply mapped existing federal law on to state politics.119
Conclusion: A Liberal Rhetoric
The electoral reforms that flowed from Fitzgerald — fairer electoral maps, optional 
preferential voting and campaign finance regulation — were democratically 
laudable. None, however, was ground-breaking, let alone radical. The quirky nod to 
a small number of geographically vast electorates offended one vote, one value 
purists, but was of little practical consequence.120
Electors in the rapidly growing south-east conurbation could, however, at last 
feel that their votes were equal to those of their rural cousins. Whilst 
administrations since have sought to govern for the whole state, the parliamentary 
dominance of the south-east has undoubtedly intensified focus on the development 
and problems of that region. MPs representing remote areas face greater 
constituency challenges than under zonal weighting. Although Premier Borbidge of 
the National Party headed a minority Coalition government for two years in the 
1990s, he was a product of the Gold Coast, in the south-east corner. It is unlikely 
that a rural Queensland MP will ever be Premier again. Demographic shifts now 
replicated in the electoral map have turned the state’s politics to Labor and shifted 
the balance on the conservative side towards the philosophy of urban neo-liberalism 
rather than the Nationals’ more interventionist brand of regional and agrarian 
development.
While the electoral maps are purer, distortions remain. The winner-takes-all 
electoral system guarantees this. At its height in 1974, the disparity between votes 
earned and seats won by the Country/National Party was 19.68 percentage points. 
Yet, even under one vote, one value, that figure was topped twice and equalled once 
by the Beattie Labor governments in 2001–06.121 That fact, as much as any changes 
to the electoral maps or the introduction of OPV, drove the National and Liberal 
Parties in 2008 to merge at state level into the Liberal-National Party.
The Fitzgerald process, for all its flowering of potential, did not open up an era 
of permanent reflection on, or reform to, governmental institutions, public law 
generally or electoral law in particular. The most notable oversight of the report was
any analysis, let alone critique, of Queensland’s unicameralism. This was in spite of 
Fitzgerald recognising that a single legislature was prone to executive dominance, 
and his insight that, unchecked, such dominance inexorably dragged governance 
118 Legislative Assembly of Queensland (November 1993).
119 See now Electoral Act 1992 (Qld), Schedule: Election Funding and Financial Disclosure 
Based on Part XX of the Commonwealth Electoral Act. In some respects, the EARC’s 
recommendations had gone further than the federal regime, but the state-based parties 
preferred to harmonise the two systems.
120 Currently, it is of marginal value to just four outlying electorates.
121 In 1974, the then Country Party received 27.88 per cent of the total votes (without 
contesting most seats), but 47.56 per cent of the seats. The comparable ratios of primary 
votes to seats won by Labor in 2001, 2004 and 2006 were 48.93 per cent to 74.16 per 
cent; 47.01 per cent to 70.79 per cent; and 46.92 per cent to 66.29 per cent.
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from public spiritedness into cronyism and corruption. Echoing Lord Hailsham’s
concern of a drift from legislative to executive dominance, Queensland researchers 
have recently asked whether unicameralism risks ‘elective dictatorship’.122 Yet 
Fitzgerald did not even broach the topic and the EARC interpreted its remit as not 
extending to such a contentious and fundamental reform.123
Perhaps this is explicable given the lack of any partisan interest in resurrecting 
the Legislative Council. But it is difficult to understand, since electoral reform 
nestles in the broader question of parliamentary design, and difficult to defend, 
since for at least a decade prior the federal Senate had been reinventing itself as a 
genuine house of review. The parliament gave the EARC a potentially wide leeway 
to report into ‘the operation of Parliament’ and ‘public administration’.124 However, 
the farthest the EARC strayed from the Fitzgerald blueprint and its legislative terms 
of reference was to write a general report on constitutional consolidation, which 
eschewed the absence of a house of review.125 If ever there were an occasion to 
seriously reopen the question of bicameralism in Queensland, the Fitzgerald process 
was it, but it was lost.126
A second, interrelated debate left glaringly unopened concerned proportional 
representation.127 Admittedly, in Australia only the small jurisdictions of Tasmania 
and the ACT elect governments via proportional representation. But the model of a 
proportionally elected upper house like the Senate was an obvious and well-
accepted compromise for Fitzgerald or the EARC to recommend. It could have 
addressed deeper problems with accountability and participation that had haunted 
Queensland well prior to Bjelke-Petersen. A reform such as this, however, would 
have challenged the entrenched interests of all the major parties. To the EARC, ‘the 
major problems of Queensland’s present electoral system lie in the drawing of 
electoral boundaries and undue electoral weightage’.128 But this was as much an 
expression of an unaccountable government as a cause. In terms of parliamentary 
and electoral reform, the Fitzgerald process was more a makeover — a partial 
liberalisation and catch-up — than a real revolution.
We should not be too harsh, however. Significant electoral reform is difficult 
to achieve at the best of times. And the electoral law catch-up that the Fitzgerald 
process helped inaugurate seemed improbable at the height of Bjelke-Petersenism. 
At the peak of his powers, that Premier was an unrivalled rhetorician. His was 
among an unusual handful of governments that do not waste political capital for 
122 Aroney et al (2008).
123 EARC Report (Nov 1990), paras 9.48–9.60.
124
Electoral and Administrative Review Act 1989 (Qld), s 2.10(1)(a). The EARC 
interpreted its remit as not extending to such a contentious and fundamental reform: 
EARC Report (Nov 1990), paras 9.48–9.60.
125 EARC (August 1993). This culminated in the consolidating Constitution of Queensland 
2001 and Parliament of Queensland Act 2001, involving public consultation through a 
Constitutional Review Commission, without bicameralism featuring on the agenda.  
126 Aroney and Prasser, this issue.
127 EARC Report (Nov 1990), Ch 4, runs relatively perfunctorily through alternatives to 
single-member electorates.
128 EARC Report (Nov 1990), para 4.56.
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marginal gains or legal cover, but use partisan electoral maps to hold power
robustly. There is a long historical catalogue of governments that, now departed, 
might have once thought themselves securely propped up by gerrymandered or 
malapportioned foundations. Yet Queensland under Bjelke-Petersen reminds us that 
sometimes it is not what the law does, but what it expresses, that has the most 
political salience. In the electoral law context, the right bark — loud enough and 
pitched just right — carries the fiercest bite. The era demonstrates how control of 
the rhetorical function of electoral law can translate into astonishing political 
success. But the era also pictures such success as brittle, and indeed illusory —
subject to quick collapse and stark reversal when a state’s electors stop believing in 
the collective illusion, as the Fitzgerald process helped them to do. 
The illusion was dispelled by the uncovering of corruption, in the form of 
police and politicians on the take. As that story unfurled, the agrarian strong-man 
resigned, leaving a power vacuum his party was ill-prepared to fill. That vacuum 
was filled, in the first instance, by Fitzgerald himself. For a short but crucial year or 
so, one strong-man in the form of Tony Fitzgerald QC supplanted another in the 
form of Premier Bjelke-Petersen. The power Fitzgerald wielded was of a different 
order. His legitimacy derived from the status of his commission and the perceived 
probity and success of its anti-corruption work. But it was essentially an autocratic 
achievement to supplant the old rhetoric and principles with a new (for Queensland) 
liberal agenda. The spadework was then delegated to a powerful, temporary 
bureaucracy, in the form of bodies such as the EARC, independent of the by then 
stultified public service.
Sometimes reform requires the worst of times — earth-shattering scandal and 
regime change, as in Queensland. It may require transcending parliamentary 
sovereignty and effectively ceding power to an expert commission, as happened 
with the EARC and, a few years earlier, the New Zealand Royal Commission on the 
Electoral System.129 Fitzgerald’s manoeuvre was not to anoint himself as expert, 
judge and jury over the electoral system. He neither decreed one vote, one value,
nor attempted to suggest a model redistribution mechanism. Rather, he smelt the 
breeze and declared the old order illiberal. The rest, in retrospect, flowed as day 
follows night.
References
Secondary Sou rces
AEC (Australian Electoral Commission) (1985), Community of Interest: Papers Presented to a 
Workshop on the Concept of the Community of Interest in Redistributions, Research Report No 3, 
AGPS.
Michael Ahern (1989), The Electoral Weightage System, National Party of Australia, Queensland.
129 The NZRCES report, Towards a Better Democracy (Wellington, 1986) led to the radical 
change to mixed member proportional representation, approved by referenda in
1992–93.
ORR AND LEVY: ELECTORAL MALAPPORTIONMENT 663
Nicholas Aroney, Scott Prasser and John Nethercote (eds) (2008), Restraining Elective Dictatorship: the 
Upper House Solution?, University of Western Australia Press.
Michael Behiels (1985), Prelude to Québec’s Quiet Revolution: Liberalism Versus Neo-nationalism, 
1945-1960, McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Neal Blewett and Dean Jaensch (1971), Playford to Dunstan: the Politics of Transition, Longman 
Cheshire.
Frank Brennan (1983), Too Much Order, Too Little Law, University of Queensland Press.
Peter Coaldrake (1978), Working the System: Government in Queensland, University of Queensland 
Press.
Stewart Cockburn (1991), Playford: Benevolent Despot, Axiom.
Walter Crocker (1983), Sir Thomas Playford: A Portrait, Melbourne University Press.
Donald Cuccioletta and Martin Lubin (2003/4), ‘The Québec Quiet Revolution: A Noisy Evolution’ 
36 Québec Studies 125.
EARC (1990), Report on Queensland Legislative Assembly Electoral System, Vol 1, November, EARC.
EARC (1992), Report on an Investigation of Public Registration of Political Donations, Public Funding 
of Election Campaigns and Related Issues, February, EARC.
EARC (1993), Report on Consolidation and Review of the Queensland Constitution, August, EARC.
George Egerton (2004), ‘Writing the Canadian Bill of Rights: Religion, Politics, and the Challenge of 
Pluralism 1957–1960’ 19 Canadian Journal of Law & Society 1.
Terence Fay and Terry Fay (2002), A History of Canadian Catholics: Gallicanism, Romanism, and 
Canadianism, McGill-Queen’s Press.
Gerald E (Tony) Fitzgerald (1989) Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities 
and Associated Police Misconduct, (Fitzgerald Report), GoPrint.
Raymond Steele Hall et al (1973), A Liberal Awakening: the LM Story, Investigator Press.
Brian Head (1986), ‘Queensland Political Culture: A Critical Note on an Enduring Legend’ 5 Social 
Alternatives 45.
Gérard Hébert (1991), ‘Building Industrial Relations as a Field of Study: The Life and Times of Gérard
Dion’ 98(1) Queen’s Quarterly 127.
House of Commons (Canada) (1882), Debates, Government of Canada.
Samuel Issacharoff (2002), ‘Gerrymandering and Political Cartels’ 116 Harvard Law Review 593.
Dean Jaensch (1970), ‘A Functional “Gerrymander”: South Australia 1944–1970’ 42 The Australian 
Quarterly 96.
Dean Jaensch (1981), ‘Electoral Reform’, in Andrew Parkin and Allan Patience (eds), Dunstan Decade: 
Social Democracy at the State Level, Longman Cheshire.
Pamela S Karlan (1998), ‘The Fire Next Time: Reapportionment After The 2000 Census’ 50 Stanford 
Law Review 731.
Norm Kelly (2006), ‘Western Australian Electoral Reforms: Labor Finally Succeeds’ 41 Australian 
Journal of Political Science 419.
Michael Klarman (1997), ‘Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem’ 85 Georgetown 
Law Journal 491.
Pierre Laporte (1960), The True Face of Duplessis, Harvest House.
Francine Legaré and Jonathan Kaplansky (2004), Samuel de Champlain: Father of New France, XYZ 
Press.
Legislative Assembly of Queensland (1991), Report of the Parliamentary Committee for Electoral and 
Administrative Review on an Electoral and Administrative Review Commission Report on Queensland 
Legislative Assembly System, February, Queensland Government.
664 GRIFFITH LAW REVIEW (2009) VOL 18 NO 3
Legislative Assembly of Queensland (1993), Parliamentary Committee for Electoral and Administrative 
Review, Report on Public Registration of Political Donations, Public Funding of Election Campaigns 
and Related Issues, November, Queensland Government.
Ron Levy (2008), ‘Regulating Impartiality: Electoral Boundary Politics in the Administrative Arena’ 
53 McGill Law Journal 1.
David Lublin and Michael McDonald (2006), ‘Is It Time to Draw the Line? The Impact of Redistricting 
on Competition in State House Elections’ 5 Election Law Journal 144.
Hugh Lunn (1978), Joh: The Life and Political Adventures of Johannes Bjelke-Petersen, University of 
Queensland Press.
R MacGregor Dawson (1935), ‘The Gerrymander of 1882’ 1 Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science 197.
Malcolm Mackerras (1990a), ‘How Unfair is Queensland’s Electoral System?’ in Scott Prasser, Rae 
Wear and John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: the Fitzgerald Vision, University of 
Queensland Press.
Malcolm Mackerras (1990b) ‘A Revisionist Interpretation of the Impact of Queensland’s Electoral 
Scheme’ 25 Australian Journal of Political Science 339.
Louis Massicotte (1994), ‘Éclipse et retour du gerrymander linguistique’, in AG Gagnon and A Noël 
(eds), L’Espace québécois, Québec/Amérique.
Richard Muir and Ronan Paddison (1981), Politics, Geography and Behaviour, Taylor and Francis.
New Zealand Royal Commission on the Electoral System (1986), Towards a Better Democracy,
NZRCES.
‘Note: A New Map: Partisan Gerrymandering as a Federalism Injury’ (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review
1196.
Peter Oliver (1999), ‘Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment’ 49 University of Toronto Law 
Journal 519.
Nathaniel Persily (2002), ‘In Defence of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial 
Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders’ 116 Harvard Law Review 649.
John Playford (1982), ‘The “Playmander” Reassessed’, May Quadrant 64.
Paul Reynolds (1990), ‘Problems and Prospects for Electoral Reform after Fitzgerald’, in Scott Prasser, 
Rae Wear and John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of 
Queensland Press.
Paul Reynolds (2002), Lock, Stock and Barrel: A Political Biography of Mike Ahern, University of 
Queensland Press.
Paul Reynolds (2003), ‘Michael John Ahern: Conservative Reformer’, in Denis Murphy et al (eds), The 
Premiers of Queensland, 3rd ed, University of Queensland Press.
Paul Reynolds (2009), The Politics of Queensland: 1980 to the Present, Central Queensland University 
Press (forthcoming).
Kirsten Robinson (2003), ‘One Vote, One Value: the WA Experience’, in Graeme Orr, Bryan Mercurio 
and George Williams (eds), Realising Democracy: Electoral Law in Australia, Federation Press.
François Rocher (2002), ‘The Evolving Parameters of Quebec Nationalism’ 4 International Journal on 
Multicultural Societies 1.
Claude Ryan (1967), ‘Quebec Changes Governments’ 45 Foreign Affairs 148.
Jenny Tilby Stock (1992), ‘The “Playmander” Revisited: The Significance of Cross-Voting in 
Estimating the Two-Party Vote in South Australia, 1943–1953’ 26 Australian Journal of Political 
Science 331.
Pierre Trudeau (1952), ‘Reflexions sur la politique au Canada français’ 6 Cité Libre 53.
ORR AND LEVY: ELECTORAL MALAPPORTIONMENT 665
Peter B Waite (1975–76), ‘Chartered Libertine? A Case Against Sir John Macdonald and Some 
Answers’ 3 Manitoba Historical Society Transactions 32.
James Walter (1990), ‘Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: “The Populist Autocrat”’, in Denis Murphy, Roger 
Joyce and Margaret Cribb (eds), The Premiers of Queensland, University of Queensland Press.
John Wanna (2004), ‘Democratic and Electoral Shifts in Queensland: Back to First Past the Post 
Voting’, Democratic Audit of Australia Discussion Paper, 
http://democratic.audit.anu.edu.au/categories/auditpapersfrm.htm
Rae Wear (1990), ‘The Weighting Game: Do the Nationals Have a Case?’ in Scott Prasser, Rae Wear 
and John Nethercote (eds), Corruption and Reform: The Fitzgerald Vision, University of Queensland 
Press.
Rae Wear (2002), Johannes Bjelke-Petersen: The Lord’s Premier, University of Queensland Press.
Max Weber (1946), ‘Politics as a Vocation’, in HH Gerth and C Wright Mills (trans and eds), From Max 
Weber: Essays in Sociology, Oxford University Press.
Deane Wells (1979), The Deep North, Outback Press.
Robert Williams (1999), ‘Democracy, Development and Anti-corruption Strategies: Learning from the 
Australian Experience’ 37 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 135.
Cases
A-G (Commonwealth); Ex rel McKinlay v Commonwealth (1975) 135 CLR 1
Australian Communist Party v The Commonwealth (1951) 83 CLR 1
Baker v Carr 369 US 186 (1962)
Davis v Bandemer 478 US 109 (1986)
Hulme v Madison County 188 F Supp 2d 1041 (2001)
McGinty v Western Australia (1996) 186 CLR 140
Raîche v Canada (Attorney General) [2004] FC 679
Reference re Electoral Boundaries Commission Act (Saskatchewan) [1991] 2 SCR 158
Reynolds v Sims 377 US 533 (1964)
Roncarelli v Duplessis [1959] SCR 121
Shaw v Reno 509 US 630 (1993)
Switzman v Elbling [1957] SCR 285
Vieth v Jubelirer 541 US 267 (2004)
Leg is lat ion
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Constitution Act 1934 (SA)
Constitution of Queensland 2001
Elections Act 1983 (Qld)
Electoral Act 1992 (Qld)
Electoral Amendment Act 1994 (Qld)
Electoral and Administrative Review Act 1989 (Qld)
Order-in-Council of 26/5/1987 (Qld)
Parliament of Queensland Act 2001
Voting Rights Act 1965, 42 USC 1973
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
